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Abstract: 
This paper is an extension of the arguments and examples offered in ‘Materia Prima,  
Text-as Image’ (Calvert: 2012), where the materiality of language was foregrounded, 
rather than its transparent role in communication. The claims of neutrality to content 
in The Crystal Goblet, made by Beatrice Warde, alongside ideas from various 
traditional philosophical sources were contrasted with the work of concrete poets, 
artist, and designers, whose free-play with materiality in language upsets those 
relatively uncomplicated notions of transparency to content. The current paper 
proposes that in the next stage, we might think of the materiality of language as a 
kind of ‘event’, in which the raw materials of language (whether writing/typography/ 
speech), are fully mobilized and enacted. This performative stage, which harnesses 
the dynamic attributes of language, is grounded by reference to Deleuze’s theory of 
the event, as well as Adorno and Benjamin’s notion of ‘constellation’. Katherine 
Hayles, Villém Flusser and others, are used to support the contention that we might 
think materiality and performativity/gesture, in language as a form of content. 
Lyotard’s Discourse/Figure is invoked as away to describe a different space of 
interaction between the textual and the figural, where the distinction between them is 
erased. Examples from art/design/typography are offered to support these points.  
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Materia Secunda: Text as Image, II 
 
Part 1. Materiality  
 
 
‘An almost infinite effort is required for the eye to give in to form, to become 
receptive to the energy stored therein. Here we must keep at arm’s length the 
assumptions, interpretations and habits of reading that we contract with the 
predominant use of discourse. It is precisely of this skill that discursive 
education and teaching deprive us: to remain permeable to the floating 
presence of the line (of value, of colour). From the very beginning, our 
culture rooted out sensitivity to plastic space’ (Lyotard 2011: 212) 
 
In the opening quote, taken from Discourse/Figure, Lyotard reminds us that in a culture which 
is, and has been, dominated by textual discourse, language1 as a phenomena needs to be 
constantly interrogated and placed under scrutiny. In an earlier paper ‘Materia Prima, Text-as-
Image’, written for the Journal of Writing and Creative Practice (Calvert 2012), I attempted to 
demonstrate how the materiality of language (whether written/typeset/spoken) has a potential, 
and latency, which precedes any specific instance of its participation in of 
communication/meaning: foregrounding languages’ base materiality, or ‘plasticity’, prior to 
its ordered configuration in discourse. Historically, and by convention, the material qualities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The word ‘Language’, for the purposes of this paper, is to be understood as those forms of 
communication which involve, variously, written/typeset/spoken words, and which convey content 
from the minds of one person to another. Typography, as in the setting of text as a particular group of 
aesthetic practices, is not per se the subject matter of the paper, but is acknowledged as forming one 
aspect of the material dimension/presentation of language: how it ‘looks’, or languages’ ‘visuality’. 
However, the paper takes a step back from a view of language as a transparent vehicle for content, and 
focuses on its raw material: prior to denotation. This primary material is argued to have a productively 
disruptive presence in the field of communication, one which constitutes a different kind of meaning.  
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of language (taken in its broad sense to mean writing/speech), become subservient to 
semantics/meaning; slipping into the background, as though an invisible window onto content. 
The term ‘material language’, as used throughout this paper, can be compared to what 
Katherine Hayles has termed ‘visual typography’ (Hayles 2002: 65), where the visual 
attributes of letters, including typestyle, scale, construction, are components in the 
establishment of meaning, and in which the medium is as significant as the message 
conveyed: what Hayles refers to as a ‘typotext’ (Hayles 2002: 65). While Hayles wonders 
why materiality has been an underexplored subject within literary studies, she states that: 
‘Significant Exceptions include the tradition of artists’ books and the exuberant experiments 
of such materially-based practices such as concrete poetry’ (Hayles 2002: 19)  
However, the aim of this paper, and the earlier one, is to extend these definition of 
material language, or ‘visual typography’ to include reflections on the non-stylistic 
characteristics of language, and to look beyond the construction or typographic presentation 
of letters in the way Vilém Flusser proposes: ‘If we want to seize what the gesture of writing 
really is about, we have to consider its original form’ (Flusser 1991:1). He goes on to say, of 
writing that:  
 
   —Flusser, The Gesture of Writing, 1991. 
 
 
In this essay, Flusser is concerned with the material event of writing, not with any content or 
external reality which it may concern or denote.  In returning the reader’s focus to both the 
material facts and actions of writing, he exposes the ways in which writing becomes: ‘a 
gesture of such complexity that it defies description’ (Flusser 1991: 2). In doing so, he 
explicitly suggests that we focus on pure form, or plasticity in-itself as a source of meaning 
for the act of writing; an approach which does not rely on the stylistic attributes of text as it 
appears on the page, and which stands distinct from the discipline of typography, which: ‘is 
concerned with the determination of the appearance of the printed page’ (Bil’ak, P. ‘What is 
Typography’, (Typotheque: 2007). However, as Lyotard points out, in the quoted passage 
from Discourse/Figure which opens this paper, (Lyotard 2011),	  there are ‘assumptions’ which 
we bring to the habits of reading, which deprive us of the ability to appreciate the 
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plastic/material qualities of language as part of the establishment of meaning. Katherine 
Hayles, in ‘Writing Machines’ (Hayles: 2002) explains how in the consideration of written 
texts, even cultural studies, which has traditionally paid more attention to materiality, usually 
focuses on ‘artifacts outside the literary text rather that the text itself as a material object’ 
(Hayles 2002: 19). These habits extend from readers to writers, whose understanding of the 
role of the materiality of language (usually demonstrated in the form of typography) in the 
publication of their works, is frequently limited, and is often relegated to the functional realm, 
where aesthetic considerations of the typographic style in which text is presented are 
secondary, if relevant at all. This in turn invokes Beatrice Warde’s remarks in her classic 
essay: ‘The Crystal Goblet, or Why Printing Should be Invisible’ (Warde, 1955). To briefly 
reprise Warde’s argument:  
“Imagine that you have before you a flagon of wine. You have two goblets 
before you. One is of solid gold, wrought in the most exquisite patterns. The 
other is of crystal-clear glass, thin as a bubble, and as transparent. Pour and 
drink; and according to your choice of goblet, I shall know whether or not 
you are a connoisseur of wine. For if you have no feelings about wine one 
way or the other, you will want the sensation of drinking out of a vessel that 
may have cost thousands of pounds; but if you are a member of that 
vanishing tribe, the amateurs of fine vintages, you will choose the crystal, 
because everything about it is calculated to reveal rather than hide the 
beautiful thing which it was meant to contain. Bear with me in this long-
winded and fragrant metaphor; for you will find that almost all the virtues of 
the perfect wine-glass have a parallel in typography… The most important 
thing about printing is that it conveys thought, ideas, images, from one mind 
to other minds. This statement is what you might call the front door of the 
science of typography. Type well used is invisible as type, just as the perfect 
talking voice is the unnoticed vehicle for the transmission of words, ideas”. 
 
(note: I have an original copy of Warde’s book, and will scan and introduce the text 
as an image, as with the Flusser) 
 
Rooted firmly in printing history, and the tradition of fine book design, Warde’s 
comments reflect a significant and long-lasting prejudice in typographic circles, and those of 
writers, that typography should be invisible to content, and that the material qualities of 
written language should not be allowed to interfere with the transmission of ideas, from the 
mind of the writer, to the mind of the reader. This prejudice, arguably, dominates the world of 
book design, and infers that the relationship between the writer of words, and the typographer 
should be one where ‘invisibility’ reigns. Throughout ‘Writing Machines’, Katherine Hayles 
challenges this view, and updates its significance for digital literature (Hayles 2002). Flusser, 
in ‘The Gesture of Writing’ (1991), and ‘Does Writing Have a Future?’ (1987), focuses on 
the act of writing, rather than what writing ‘does’. Philosophers from Derrida to George 
Steiner, have made significant contributions to the way we understand language in its 
broadest sense, and specifically in it relation to materiality (cf Derrida ‘Of Grammatology’, 
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1976, Steiner, ‘The Poetry of Thought’ 2011) . However, it continues to be the case that aside 
from well-documented historical experimental works such as Derrida’s ‘Glas’ (Derrida, 1986). 
Or Avital Ronell’s ‘The Telephone Book’ (Ronell, 1989), and more recent work by the 
publishing house Visual Editions, who have collaborated with writers such as Jonathan Safran 
Foer, those writers who have concerned themselves with the material attributes of their 
language, are still working largely against the received wisdom, and norms for textual 
presentation: challenging the paradigm long established by Warde and her conservative 
proponents.  
In response, in Materia Prima, Text-as-Image 1, I showed some relatively simple 
examples of how typographers, designers, artists and illustrators have historically intuitively 
understood the ‘performative’ nature of language as a plastic/material phenomena, and have 
freely played with its creative potential, or ‘energy’, both in collaboration with writers, poets 
and artists, as well as autonomously. I advocated a step back to allow a refocusing on the 
inherent, material attributes of written language, as source of meaning (this argument could 
be equally applied to speech, but the paper did not address this, except tangentially). The 
argument made there included reflections on concrete poetry, book artists, and others, 
including e. e. cummings, H. N. Werkman, Tom Phillips, Kurt Schwitters, and the work of 
the artist Cy Twombly. The proposition of ‘Materia Prima’ was that the numerous artists, 
typographers, designers, writers and illustrators who have worked both in collaboration and 
alone, demonstrate the role of materiality in language as a partner in the production of 
meaning, by exhibiting language ‘as such’. They fully engage with John Dewey’s remark, 
‘All language, whatever its medium, involves what is said, and how it is said, or substance 
and form’ (Dewey 1980: 106). Dewey’s comment reinforces the significance of medium, or 
the formal qualities of language, as an intimate partner in the production of meaning, and 
communication. For Dewey, the subject matter of language (what it refers to) is different 
from language itself (its matter, or material), but the latter affects or modifies the former. In 
the contemporary context of digital literature, Hayles describes these phenomena as 
‘technotexts’, where: ‘the physical form of the literary artifact always affects what the words 
(and other semiotic components) mean’ (Hayles 2002: 24), This constitutes what she terms a 
‘media specific analysis’, wherein ‘technotexts is a kind of criticism that pays attention to the 
material apparatus producing the literary work as physical artifact’ (Hayles 2002: 29). Hayles, 
Flusser, Dewey, Derrida, and others, all return reflections on language to its ‘surface[s]’, 
which is the philosopher Richard Shusterman’s departure point. He locates a phenomenon 
within the traditional literary and philosophical communities, of a deep antipathy towards 
writing, in favour of the ‘authenticity’ of speech. Shusterman proposes that the surface of 
language (along with both windows and pixels) is frequently invisible: it often has no more 
than a residual impact upon our conscious apprehension: ‘We do not usually notice the 
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surface of our glass windows because we are looking through them; nor do we notice the 
particular color and size of the pixels on our computer screen as we look at them to grasp the 
images they constitute’  (Shusterman 2002: 159) 
What this remark unequivocally establishes is that by convention (one could almost 
go as far as to say, by definition), language is supposed to ‘point’, away from itself, and 
towards another concept, reality or object. The surface is redundant (echoing Warde), but 
Shusterman, unlike Warde wants to argue for a revisitation of the importance of surface, not 
to reinforce its redundancy. However, in referring back to itself, as material, matters of 
communication become complicated and paradoxical, since when the graphical ‘surface’ of 
language is emphasized (for the purposes of Shusterman’s proposition, to be understood as 
typeface, size, position, etc.), and languages’ role in communication is exposed the usual 
distinctions between discourse and figure (Lyotard 2011), text and image, collapse in a vortex 
of self-referentiality.2 We are entered into a paradoxical space, where initially it is not clear 
what language is under these conditions. It seems to have no role, and, moreover, upsets 
notions of transparency in communication, since it points towards itself, and nothing else, 
with the full opacity of language, constituting what Lyotard terms a ‘scandalous’ form of 
materiality, which disrupts the conformity of textual relations (Lyotard 2011). However, as 
the typographer and artists highlighted in ‘Materia Prima’ confirm, after reflection, we see 
that with the relative slowness of the figural (image), the persistence of the plasticity of form 
in text (discourse) brings us to a stop, creating another space of reflection, somewhere 
between the figural and the discursive. As Lyotard remarks, ‘Once again it [plasticity] will 
slow down the eye, and judgment, forcing the mind to take position in front of the sensory’ 
(2011: 212). He proposes that we need to pay attention to this visual surface, in order to fully 
understand written language3, through ‘the understanding of the graphic form in and of itself, 
and thus the patient probing of the plastic meaning it carries’ (2011: 211). Giorgio Agamben 
states this same point, slightly differently; ‘To bring the word to a stop is to pull it out of the 
flux of meaning, to exhibit it as such’ (Agamben 2002: 317), and Arthur C. Danto reiterates it, 
in a remark about cinema that can easily be reinterpreted with respect to language:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Lyotard’s understanding of the relationship between text and image is distinct from the 
critic W. J. T. Mitchell’s ‘textimage’ (WJT Mitchell, Iconology: Image, Text, and Ideology, 1987), 
which Hales criticizes as not fully recognizing the significance of text-as-image, but stays at 
the level of texts and images alone (Hayles 202: 20), and does not acknowledge any other 
forms of materiality. Lyotard is attempting subtle critique of structuralism, in which, he 
argues, the discursive and the figural modes of knowing have been separated within abstract 
thought. He wants to defend the importance of the sensual, and figural (associated with 
seeing), in the mutual implication of discourse and figure. He cites the examples of poetry, 
and illuminated manuscripts, which bring discursive and figural modes of knowing into 
alignment (Lyotard 2011).	  3	  These remarks about ‘surface’ can be extended to include spoken language and its acoustic 
properties, but a full explication of this point is outside the scope of the present paper.	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We do not become aware of [language/time] in ordinary [reading] because 
too much takes place in [language] for [language] itself to become the object 
of consciousness’. The sign can signify anything except that it is in the 
process of signifying. (1997: 67) 
 
In summary, I proposed to call these kinds of self-referring, figural/plastic language Materia 
Prima or Prima Materia, the Latin term for ‘primary matter’ or ‘first source’. It was used to 
suggest a form of material language that has no function other than to be an image of itself, or 
to refer to its own ‘surfaces’, possessing an almost alchemical quality, comprising formless, 
undifferentiated base material(s), which nonetheless possesses enormous creative and analytic 
potential. In other words, this Prima Materia was posed as an undifferentiated plastic material 
that has a different kind of meaning, and which has the potential to close the space between 
image and text, or between what Lyotard has describes as the discursive and figural.  
For instance, the printed experiments of H. N. Werkman exemplify the idea that; 
‘freedom of the press belongs to those who own one’ (Leibling: 1960), also that type can 
function independently of communicating a specific message, or denoting something external, 
and that his playful method of working with text (in this case, the medium was letterpress) is 
as productive as any specific intentionality, system, or method. “The subject proclaims itself, 
and is never sought’, he would say, in terms of his habit of working directly on the bed of the 
press, and seeing what emerged. This is not language as an instrumental partner in the 
expression of ideas, concepts or reason; which takes a backseat, or hides in the shadows, as 
Warde proscribes, but something closer to a musical instrument, being ‘played’, and which 
can be experienced at the point where text ‘kisses’ paper, and ink sticks to the surface of 
wood and metal; the tones and gestures of the visual surface, resonating with sensual and 
visual frequencies. This is intense radical material articulation, operating at the visual surface; 
drawing our attention firmly toward the surface, using language as Material Prima, or a-priori, 
undifferentiated form. In doing so, it articulates the point at which meaning is/is not 
established in written language, by attempting to break the link between text/type/writing, and 
meaning. Its very failure to fully do so is meaningful.  
With his self-authored use of print as paint, Werkman, understands that the material 
event of language is meaningful in and of itself; requiring no other justification. Language 
just ‘is’ in his hands, and its full opacity makes no concessions to any author of the words. 
The intelligence of this work is in the stand it takes against ‘transparency’, and in its radical 
concern with the ‘matter’ of language/communication. It also begs the profoundest of 
questions about “the thin film at the limit of words and things” (Deleuze: 1969, 38), in ways 
which any number of written accounts cannot accomplish. This is the metaphor through 
which Deleuze attempts to describe the notion of ‘sense’ in language. By attempting to break 
the link between printed text and meaning, yet never quite succeeding, Werkman is able to 
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articulate these questions at more than just a metaphorical level, and without closing them 
down; allowing room for interpretation, through fearless experimentation with the primary 
material(s) of language. 
Similarly, the artist Cy Twombly’s work conspicuously foregrounds the act of 
reading; the ‘work’ of language, not the meaning of words themselves. In other words, it asks 
you to ‘hear’ the hearing of the work, to ‘read’ the reading, and to look at the surface 
presentation of the drawn, marked, inscribed, heavily materialized written language language 
he employs. This applies as much to his work with text as with image or symbol. He 
constantly defers meaning in favour of focusing on material expression. Working almost 
three-dimensionally with thick impasto, and scratched marks on surfaces was, for Twombly, a 
way of exploring materials and the meaning they promised, but did not reveal.  
John Berger puts it in this way:  ‘Twombly imposes his materials on us not as 
something which is going to serve some purpose, but as absolute matter, manifested in its 
glory’ (Berger 2002). As Werkman exposed, whether it is possible to make work with written 
language that is entirely self-referential, since even the most ephemeral or distorted elements 
of a visual language tend to cling tenaciously to meaning, is an open question, and one that 
Twombly, Werkman and others from the worlds of concrete poetry and artistic practice are at 
the centre of. In a remark about Twombly, Berger pointed to the inherent complexities in this 
project when he said: 
“The materia prima [raw material] is what exists prior to the division 
operated by meaning: an enormous paradox since nothing, in the human 
order, comes to man unless it is immediately accompanied by a meaning, the 
meaning which other men have given it, and so on, in an infinite regress. The 
[demiurgic] power of the painter is in this, that he makes the materials exist 
as matter; even if some meaning comes out of the painting, pencil and color 
remain as “things”, at stubborn substances whose obstinacy in “being there” 
nothing (no subsequent meaning) can destroy.”  —The Wisdom of Art, John 
Berger 
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Cy Twombly: Untitled, Lexington, 1959, House paint, crayon and graphite 
on canvas. 152.5 x 188.5 cm, 60 x 74 1/4 inches 
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Image 2:  The PDU (Plaque Découpée Universelle) is a universal stencil created by Dries 
Wiewauters (based on a stencil system patented by Joseph A. David in 1876). The stencil can 
make uppercase, lowercase, accents and so on - Each cut can make 1579 glyphs. This 
simplification of the visual codes of written language, points us to the formal attributes of 
language, but also highights its arbitrary nature: lines/circles/angles. 
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Following Lyotard’s logic, in a self-initiated project considering the arbitrary nature of 
linguistic form, and its base materiality, Margherita Brooke-Huntley, a recent graduate of 
Central St. Martins College of Art, produced the following series of explorations of 
typographic form/language, which respond to Lyotards’ idea that ‘A line, without the system 
of connoted meaning is unrecognisable.’ (Lyotard 2011: 211). The letters, broken down into 
their constituent parts, become unrecognizable: Materia Prima. At a second level, they take 
form, and become readable (once the system is learned). In the final iteration (lower image), 
the original line from Lyotard’s text is rewritten, in this new, disjunctive typeface, created 
from the dismembered parts of the original.  
 
‘A letter’s rhythm, position and sequence refer to a position occupied by the 
reader’, the text ‘faces’ the reader. Letters don’t represent anything, they are 
not pictograms: ’A, N and Z all have the same constituent parts/lines. They 
are terms that are only to be recognised as part of their place in the system 
they belong to (the alphabet/word) and their spacing (I.e AN, A, A NZ, ZAN 
etc)’. Punctuation and spacing changes meaning. ‘Where figural difference 
once reigned, now informational space operates only (with indications 
regarding pauses, but could rhythm suffice without punctuation?)’ (Lyotard 
2011: 211). 
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Part 2. Event/Constellation 
 
“A certain view of the world, of consciousness, and of language has been 
accepted as the correct one, and, if the minute particulars of that view are 
examined, a rather different picture (that is also a non-picture as we shall see) 
emerges. That examination involves an enquiry into the ‘operation’ of our 
most familiar gestures” —Gayatri Spivak: Preface, ‘Of Grammatology’, 
Derrida, 1974. 
 
Having reiterated the basic premise of Materia Prima, where the raw material of (in this case, 
written) language is foregrounded in place of transparent communication, the present paper 
wishes to further extend these arguments, and add another layer, by metaphorically referring 
language to the notion of  Materia Secunda. In this stage of the ‘four worlds’ the potential of 
matter, or ‘Materia Prima’is realized and set in motion.4 Applying Aristotles’ definition of 
entelechy, which is the condition of something whose essential potential is fully realized 
(actualized), this is where, it will be suggested, the full potential of language-as-raw-material 
is engaged. Moving forward from these earlier remarks about base materiality, or Materia 
Prima, I will now use the metaphor provided by Materia Secunda, to establish how it might  
affect how we understand the nature of language, and for the purposes of Book 2.0, 
specifically the relationship between this new understanding of type/language/writing, and the 
writer of words. These arguments are, by their nature, more abstract, and less easy to 
demonstrate at the level of the figurative qualities of language, and so in this paper, I will 
include some expanded reflections on the potentially productive relationship between 
philosophy and/as a form of type/writing. This will be seen through the lens of writers such as 
Walter Benjamin and Adorno, whose notion of ‘constellation’ subtly but fully engages the 
materiality of language in its formulation of a style of philosophical thought, while Gilles 
Deleuze offers the notion of the ‘event’, as a way to speak about the inexpressible attributes 
of language, where mobilization of the dynamic attributes of language takes place.   
 
‘In the broadest sense, materiality emerges from the dynamic interplay 
between the richness of a physically robust world and human intelligence as 
it crafts this physicality to create meaning’ — Katherine Hayles, Writing 
Machines, 2002: 33 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Materia Prima and Materia Secunda are terms taken from Genesis, and are used in a loosely 
metaphorical sense throughout these essays. In the former, the raw materials, or formative elements 
(earth/fire/water), are considered a blueprint to be mobilized through the next stage (Materia Secunda), 
which is described as the third of the four worlds. ‘Materia prima, cannot itself be known, inasmuch as 
things are known through their form: Materia Prima is the subject of every form’(G. M. Cornalidi, SJ, 
‘The Physical System of St. Thomas: 1893). In Materia Secunda those raw materials become active 
and enabled, subject to modifications and application. In Materia Secunda we see the dynamic 
attributes of language set in motion.	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Hayles places human action at the centre of this process, and it is this interplay between the 
raw material of language and its enactment that this section concerns itself.5  
  
Event/Sense 
In the chapter: ‘Twenty-Sixth Series of Language’, in  ‘The Logic of Sense’, Gilles Deleuze  
attempts to show how  the ‘event’ haunts language. The ‘event’, which is unspoken, and 
incorporeal, nonetheless makes language possible, subsisting in language as its primary 
means of expression, and partaking in the moment of expression.   
‘The expression, which differs in nature from the representation, acts no less 
as that which is enveloped (or not) inside the representation…  
Representation must encompass an expression which it does not represent, 
but without which it would not be ‘comprehensive’, and would have truth 
only by chance or from outside’ (Deleuze: 1990, 145)    
 
The event is that which is cannot be represented, but which nonetheless makes expression 
possible. Representation, according to Deleuze, is extrinsic by nature, operating on the basis 
of resemblance, or mimesis (understood as replica/copy); exclusively externalized in a 
process which fixes meaning. However, there is something which consistently escapes this 
manner of representation; a matter internal to the expression (enveloped, or subsisting within 
it), which provides its fully ‘comprehensive’ character while remaining enigmatically 
inexpressible at the level of the textual ‘image’. The example Deleuze uses to explain the 
concept of this ‘unrepresentable’ is death, which is a concept forever extrinsic to the 
signification as long as actual death is not realized: in other words, death is ‘deprived of sense’ 
in advance of the event of death. In this respect representation is always abstract and empty; 
incomplete and unfulfilled. Another way of saying this is that: 
‘Representation envelops the event in another nature, it envelops it at its 
borders, it stretches until this point, and it brings about this lining or hem. 
This is the operation which defines living usage, to the extent that 
representation, when it does not reach this point, remains only a dead letter 
confronting that which it represents, and stupid in its representiveness’. —
Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 1990: 145 
 
Without the event, representation would remain ‘lifeless and senseless’: the ‘extra-
representative’ exceeds the functional. However, Deleuze wants to retain the tension between 
the representable and the non-representable as that which makes possible the fullest form of 
representation and this is where the object (in this case language), is fully mobilised.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The third part of this series of remarks:	  Materia Tertia (paper in progress) will assess how these 
dynamics change within synthetic speech and artificial language(s) contexts. 	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The accounts of material language offered in Materia Prima seem at first encounter 
to be incompatible with this view, or at least of different kinds. For example, in Richard 
Shusterman’s work, there is an interest in promoting visible language as a factor in meaning; 
right at the sur[face], at the level of the Materia Prima, while Deleuze’s ‘event’ proposes an 
expression which is internal and invisible to language, but nonetheless intrinsic and crucial to 
meaning; something unrepresentable but essential. The visible/invisible distinction traversing 
these two arguments would seem irreconcilable. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
the material forms of language are of the nature of an ‘event’ in the sense Deleuze proposes, 
and that it is only at the level of the ‘pure’ event that language has full meaning (in the stage 
called Materia Secunda). It is here, where written language is both specific in terms of the 
uniqueness of each ‘event’ of language (each utterance, each printing, each inscription is an 
unrepeatable event), and where at the same time such language is abstracted from its specific 
application as a bearer of meaning or sense, that we see something newly-meaningful in the 
raw materials and dynamics of language (in the form of language in-itself, not language as a 
transparent vehicle for communication cf. Warde). For the purposes of this paper, we could 
say that the Materia Prima of language (the base material) requires the stage Materia 
Secunda (energy/event), to mobilize the full power of language as representation, and that this 
is the place where the text and the writer need to rendezvous. Where materiality and event 
configure, is the place where language and meaning become coterminous; where the ‘space’ 
of literature takes place (Blanchot 1989).  
In this scenario, rather than instrumental, purely denotative, or invisible to content (as 
in Warde’s claim), language might be thought of as differently ‘tensioned’, as in the skin of a 
drum which involves the literal tensioning of a surface to achieve textual (and acoustic) 
modulations, and which involve various resonances, expansions, contractions, temporalities, 
movements. In place of instrumental forms of language, we could productively contemplate 
language as an instrument, which needs to be ‘played’ with a sensitive eye and ear to form. 
This in turn, takes language to a kind of anarchic extreme, where: ‘[For Deleuze], writing 
means pushing the language, the syntax, all the way to a particular limit, a limit that can be a 
language of silence, or a language of music, or… for example, a painful wailing.’ (Deleuze, 
1988-89 cf. Kafka's Metamorphosis). 
Poetry could be claimed to be a residual example of the event-based anarchy of 
language, whose complexity has not been entirely stripped away in favour of function: 
‘literature is concerned with the event of language, far more than the event in language.’ 
(Lecercle 2002:  130).  Wittgenstein went as far as to say that ‘Philosophy ought really to be 
written only as poetic composition’, (cited in G. H. Von Wright 1980: 24) suggesting that the 
only way to do philosophy is to take it to the limits (and beyond) of language, and to critique 
it on its own terms, immanently (internally: from within), in the same way that poetry 
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becomes a critique of language. This requires a different orientation to the relationship 
between type and writer: one which respects the dynamic tension between the metaphysics of 
language (its immaterial qualities), and the physical properties of language as a concrete fact. 
Taken in this sense, language (in the broad sense) can be seen as a kind of controlled chaos, 
borne of the marks and sounds made by the body. It is irreducibly complex at the surface, and 
while articulation takes place, and communication does happen, it frequently does so at the 
expense of that complexity: Lecercle makes this point with respect to speech: ‘The materiality 
of sounds is inseparable from the ideality of articulate language.’ (Lecercle 2002: 129). 
Rather than trying to suppress the full articulation of language, by separating form from 
content, those writers who appreciate the intrinsic qualities of language as expression, are 
able to harness the full power of the dynamic tension between representation and meaning by 
harnessing the full materiality and event-ness of language (text/writing/speech). By 
consciously, or unconsciously working with material language in this way, creative 
practitioners and writers supplement our understanding of language, by drawing attention to 
those materially-bound qualities of language which cannot be spoken or written about. In 
other words, they enact, rather than describe, aspects of language which remain at the root of 
most critical discourses on language, but which are perforce unable to account for the 
materiality or ‘event’ of language, since they have no view from outside language where they 
could take language as an object of examination (this would require a theoretical point outside 
language, known as ‘a view from nowhere’).  
In contrast, as Walter Benjamin recognizes, for James Joyce, language is a form of 
activity which constitutes its own essence, rather than participating in pre-established discursive 
forms. His efforts are directed towards breaking the link between language and meaning as 
something pre-constituted, in favour of language as a mimetologically, constitutive medium in its 
own right. Joyce’s language does something, creates meaning (although, in truth, language never 
arrives for Joyce, it’s always on detour), and actively engages Samuel Beckett’s injunction that 
language should be ‘alive’, bringing it closer the event which Deleuze speaks of. Speaking of 
Joyce’s work, in his book ‘Dante, Bruno, Vico, Joyce’, Beckett writes: “Words are not the polite 
contortions of 20th century printer’s ink. They are alive. They elbow their way onto the page, and 
glow and blaze and fade and disappear”  For Joyce, both life and language are immanent: they 
have no ground, or origin. (Ben Zvi 1980), echoing Beckett’s remark that: “There is no 
communication because there are no vehicles of communication.” (Beckett 1957: 47). Joyce 
effects: “the writing that you find so obscure is a quintessential extraction of language and 
painting and gesture, with all the inevitable clarity of the old inarticulation.”	  (Beckett 1957).	  For 
Beckett, Joyce is able to	  move beyond what he sees as the inherent abstraction and limits of 
English, to find a raw, direct authenticity which is closer to gestural forms of painting, out of the 
	   17	  
immanent/immersive act of making language: an ‘event’, in which final meaning is never fully 
articulated.  
 
 
 
Image 1. This example of James Joyce’s literary self-constitutions includes both Joyce’s 
proof-level annotations, and the playwright Thornton Wilder’s attempts to ‘understand’ the 
text (or to decode it), through extensive personal annotation, we see how the text resists the 
assignment of singular meanings, due to its ‘constellatory’ structure, and the heterogeneous 
play of linguistic signifiers, which refer the reader back to the operations of the text itself. 
 
To further contextualize this point, Joseph Kosuth’s First Investigations (subtitled Art As Idea As 
Idea), consists of a series that includes photostats of dictionary definitions of words such as 
“water,” “meaning,” and “idea.” The simple presentation of the dictionary definition of the word 
‘meaning’, sets out the terms of a different engagement with the embodiment of ideas in 
language: questioning the terms significant, unambiguous, signified, referred to. This work can 
be seen as responding to Kosuth’s comment that: 
“Being an artist now means to question the nature of art. If one is questioning 
the nature of painting, one cannot be questioning the nature of art . . . That’s 
because the word ‘art’ is general and the word ‘painting’ is specific. Painting 
is a kind of art. If you make paintings you are already accepting (not 
questioning) the nature of art.” — Kosuth, Art After Philosophy, 1969 
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In the same way, there is an argument to be made (Derrida, Adorno, Benjamin, Flusser, Hayles 
and others have made it), that being a philosopher, or a writer, should make you question and 
exploit the nature of language, as the primary material within which ideas are communicated. 
This was certainly for numerous writers such as James Joyce and Raymond Roussel, and 
philosopher/writers such as Benjamin and Adorno. The medium in which literature and 
philosophy is expressed is language, and therefore it should be scrutinized as a medium in its 
own right, irrespective of any specific content, but in terms of its role in enframing concepts (see 
Hayles’ ‘Media Specific analysis’ 2002 and Flusser’s ‘Does Writing Have a Future?’ 1987). To 
actively demonstrate this discursive, self-reflexive aspect of art, Kosuth employed language itself 
as his medium. What resulted was a rigorously Conceptual art where intellectual provocation 
was placed parallel to perception, and words displaced images and objects. The work is therefore 
about the idea of meaning, rather than meaning itself. Deleuze, Derrida and others asked: Where 
is meaning? For Deleuze, it’s in the ‘sense’ of a word, at that: ‘thin film at the limit of words and 
things’, implying that it’s both part of, but separate from, the word: metaphysical, but physical at 
the same time; forming a nexus where sense and nonsense coexist; an event which is involved in 
both creating and dissolving a limit at the same time. 
 
 
 
Joseph Kosuth, (Art as Idea as Idea) Meaning, 1967, Photostat on paper, mounted on wood.  
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Constellation/Style 
Philosophy, literature, design and the fine arts frequently occupy different spheres of 
knowledge, and constitute separate bodies of practice. With a view to the broader aims of the 
Book 2.0 series of volumes, to build connections between often disparate communities, I 
would like to revisit the term ‘constellation’, as a way to think about artworks, literature, and 
philosophies, which engage it as a method, and in which it mobilizes the relation between 
writer and text, in a subtle way. There is value in considering the continued relevance of the 
practice and theory of constellation as both a ‘performance’ (linking it to the ‘event’ as 
described previously) of language, and a style of thinking, in which new forms of thought are 
promised, and where experimentation with language is pushed to a limit and beyond. In this 
respect, the writings of Walter Benjamin and Thodor Adorno are key to unlocking the 
potential of ‘constellation’ as a structural device for understanding language as 
enactment/event.  
 Constellation is Walter Benjamin’s term for the method of relating ideas in a 
montage of fragmentary, disjunctive, often temporally unrelated configurations, which 
nonetheless produce meaning by allowing unseen correspondences to emerge, instantaneously. 
This method can be seen most clearly in Benjamin’s Arcades Project, (Benjamin Belknapp 
Press 2002). His methodological preference shares an affinity with Adorno’s notion of 
constellation (which Adorno in turn explicitly borrowed from Benjamin), as the process 
which unlocks the ‘specific side of the object’, and where the particularities and objectivity of 
phenomena exceed conceptual categories (Adorno 1990: 162).  Benjamin explains the  
constellation as the place where:  
‘[I]deas are not represented in themselves, but solely and exclusively in an 
arrangement of concrete elements in the concept: as the configuration of 
these elements… Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars’  
— Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama 
 
Adorno’s understanding of constellation has been described as: ‘a juxtaposed rather than 
integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, 
essential core, or generative first principle’ (Jay 1984: 14-15). He utilizes the constellation as 
a way to challenge how concepts (mental constructs, or ideas) operate in ‘identity thinking’. 
Such identity thinking, or conceptual thinking wants to make a simple or generic 
classification of something thought, in such a way that objects of knowledge are blocked by 
such thought from achieving their fullness. As part of this classifying procedure, such 
concepts profoundly prohibit knowledge of the object, and strip away what Adorno would 
term the intramundane: the particularities, or singularities that make an object what it is, but 
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not in an essentialist sense (by observing the difference between things, not their shared 
identities). Such departures from identity thinking are controversial: 
‘Once it has been decided what is to count as thought, that is, what is to count 
as describing reality, any thought that does not fall under that concept will be 
attacked as nonsensical: ‘[h]ence the fanatical intolerance of the method and 
its total arbitrariness against any arbitrariness as deviation’– Adorno, Against 
Epistemology: 1984, p13  
 
Adorno’s argument is that the ordinary for of conceptual thinking (which is scaffolded by 
language) traps us into never seeing what lies beyond our concepts, in turn excluding the truth 
of things in themselves, and this is a major problem for thought, and a sticking point in terms 
of languages’ ability to provide access to truth. The fixity of language is a conspirator in this 
dilemma, since identity thinking is at the root of language, when it proceeds relatively 
unexamined. 
Adorno’s answer to this problem is that concepts should ‘enter into a constellation 
[…which] illuminates the specific side of the object, the side which to a classifying procedure 
is either a matter of indifference or a burden (1990: 162). Since, ‘Such constellations of 
concepts ‘represent from without what the concept has cut away [excised] within’ (1990:162).  
They gather around an object of cognition, and in doing so they potentially attain what was 
excluded from thinking by the apparatus of concepts supported by language. In short: 
concepts block, while constellations illuminate. Concepts limit, while constellations expand 
and proliferate. Concepts are, in that sense, uncreative, while constellations are creative, 
iterative, and process driven, rather than limited by outcomes.  The concept by itself, cannot 
but formalize, exclude (difference), freeze (in static time), and identify. All that needs to 
happen is that constellations explode the myth of identity thinking, and such groupings of 
thought as are provided by the constellation cause identity thinking to evaporate. 
Combinations of multiple concepts displace single concepts, such that subjective thought 
replaces abstract identity. However, each concept in a constellation is itself to be subjected to 
the same process, in an infinite proliferation, and grouping concepts does not necessarily 
provide access to a truth hidden by conceptual categorizing, since language is implicated in 
both forms.  
‘becoming aware of the constellation in which a thing stands is tantamount to 
deciphering the constellation which… it bears within… cognition of the object in its 
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the object’.  (1990: 162). 
 
The concept of constellation can also be seen in both Benjamin’s and Adorno’s philosophical 
writing styles in which they seek to enact these principles in which concepts are not reduced 
to categorical understandings, but are constantly exceeding their boundaries, or restraints. By 
preserving the contradictory and irreconcilable differences of arguments and observations in 
his work, Adorno maintains the tension between the universal and the particular, between 
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essentialism and nominalism while Benjamin finds meaning in the ‘interstices’, not in the 
direct objects of language, which resonates with the ‘event’ as a way of viewing the dynamic 
potential of language.  Constellations can hold contradictory meanings in suspension without 
the imposition of a totalizing closure: they promise the ‘more’ which concepts cannot express, 
because their procedure is to classify/represent, rather than ‘present’.  
The idea of ‘constellation’, then, is essential to understanding the aesthetic and formal 
qualities of the writing[s] of both Benjamin and Adorno, which are in turn immanent to their 
philosophical project[s]. In each writers’ work, form and content are not arbitrarily detached, 
but follow a simultaneously tightly woven but divergent path, which, for Adorno, denies the 
claim that: ‘In positivist practice, the content, once fixed in the model of the protocol sentence, 
is supposed to be neutral with respect to its presentation, which is supposed to be 
conventional and not determined by the subject’ (Adorno 1991: 23). As with Warde,  
presentation (form) is supposed to be a disinterested participant in the production of ideas. 
However, in his short work ‘The Essay as Form’, Adorno outlines the manner in which the 
form of philosophical writing, and its content, should be recognized as interdependent, in the 
same way that content and method are not to be rendered as separate, but intrinsically bound 
to one another. This leads him to the conclusion that it is necessary to: ‘[P]rise open the 
aspect of its objects that cannot be accommodated by concepts’ (Adorno 1991: 23)6. These 
involve the social and historical conditions of knowledge, which are lodged, or sedimented, to 
use Benjamin’s phrase, in discourse, and delimited by concepts, making it impossible to know 
objects in themselves. This argument could be equally applied to language as an objects of 
knowledge, and it is this potential which is the driving premise of the current paper. The aim 
of both Materia Prima and Materia Secunda is to bring reader and writer into a more intimate 
relation, and explore the im/material dynamics which are at the root of expression in 
writing/speech, and language in a broad sense.   
Goethe, in his Scientific Studies points to the fundamental difficulty with 
correspondence theories of truth, grounded in simple notions of identity, or of language as 
transparent and objective: “How difficult it is… to refrain from replacing the thing with its 
sign, to keep the object alive before us instead of killing it with the word” (Goethe 1995: 275).   
For Benjamin, the constellation configures the conceptual and the empirical into their original 
intimate relation, so that the sign (word) and its object are reunited. He does not seek to 
resolve contradictions or oppositions, but to retain them as ‘residue’, or the non-
communicable (Woodfield, Bush 2001: 137). Benjamin’s claim is that language has, over 
time, become predominantly instrumental, such that its mimetic, expressive aspects have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See Materia Prima, (Calvert 2012) for a description of Adorno’s Intramundane as expressed through 
a	  single printed letterform, which demonstrates how such history is sedimented in the object.	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subordinated to its role as sign7. His contention is that the ‘paradisal’ relationship between 
language and object has been eroded over time, in favour of an aesthetically and 
experientially impoverished linguistic systematization where: ‘Logical analysis is the most 
extreme expression of an objectified experience of language. The living, breathing texture of 
everyday language is denuded into a formal, technical series of procedures’ (Critchley 2001: 
104). Compare this extreme rationalization of language with Steven Connor’s remarks, based 
on Bachelard, from his paper ‘Topologies: Michel Serres and the Shapes of Thought’, where 
he states that:  
 
‘Bachelard emphasises the oneiric dynamism of the hand that is involved in 
any action in, and upon, the world, shaping the dough, or bringing to bear the 
black matter of the graphite on the white matter of the paper, in order that the 
paper may be ‘roused from its nightmare of whiteness’ — Steven Connor 
2004, citing Bachelard 1988: 52.  
 
Along with Event and Constellation as mobilizing attributes of language at the stage of 
Materia Secunda, where the raw material of Materia Prima is set in motion, I would like to 
offer a short remark on the role of noise in communication. Michel Serres thinks of noise as 
an unavoidable part of the transmission of information (Serres: 1980). Noise is a form of 
interference which happens in the process of moving any form of information between sender 
and receiver; one that occupies a frequency which registers chaos, disorder and nonsense as 
productive, not disruptive. Katherine Hayles concurs, as she considers the implication of 
noise within digital media (in the section of ‘Writing Machines’ entitled ‘Lexia to Perplexia’): 
‘The noise that permeates the text may serve as a stimulus to emergent complexity, but it also 
ensures meanings are always unstable and that totalising interpretations are impossible’ 
(Hayles 2002: 60). This kind of heterogeneous expression is akin to the constellational 
thinking which Benjamin and Adorno employ, and is an inherent attribute of digital media. 
Noise, for Serres, implies movement and disruption, instability and disjunction, rather than 
linear, stable systems which cohere. Even the process of translation is material, and that 
‘noisy’ materiality cannot (and should not) be eradicated. Yet rather than seeking to eliminate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Saussure sees the sign as an arbitrary link between signifier and signified. Structuralism privileges a 
system of differences, in which signs are networked and relational, rather than possessing 
intrinsic/expressive/mimetically-announced meaning in and of themselves. Their value depends on 
their being oppositional to other signs within the system as a whole. ‘The essential feature of Saussure's 
linguistic sign is that, being intrinsically arbitrary, it can be identified only by contrast with coexisting 
signs of the same nature, which together constitute a structured system’ Roy Harris, Translator, 
Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. P. x (need to complete reference). Signs are not concrete, or 
grounded in experience, but abstract: markers or tokens in a structure to which they defer. "A sign is 
not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept and a sound pattern" (Saussure p. 66). 
The sound of an element in speech is the signified, while the thought to which it relates is the signified. 
However, it is only within a system of similar ‘linked’ relationships between sound/concept, and 
sign/signified that meaning gets established.	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noise as an unwanted ‘excess’ to communication, Serres suggests that it is precisely here, in 
the midst of this chaotic, cacophonous environment, that the potential for new forms of 
thinking emerges from the alternative patterns created (Hayles broadly agrees). Out of noise, 
new pathways, relations, movements, and assemblages are formed, bringing together the 
virtual, synthetic and aesthetic.  
 
Enactment 
In closure, and to show how these principles might work in practice, would like to 
close with two ‘visual’ examples of enactments of some of the ideas expressed in this paper. 
The theoretical terrain I have tried to establish, with the use of the metaphorical terms 
Materia Prima and Materia Secunda, are simply means by which to demonstrate how we 
might think about text-as-image, the ‘event’ of language, ‘constellation’, and the relationship 
between form and content (surface and depth). The true test of these ideas is in the 
engagement with the material and event-based forms of writing/text, which these examples 
promote, and actively interrogate.  
 
 
 
 
Chloe True, Chatterly Black, 2012. Hand made pigment and silk screen.  
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Chloe True’s work (a recent graduate of the Design and Interaction course at Central St. 
Martins), shows how the plasticity of language can take on many guises, and offer multiple 
readings, related to the ‘constellation’. Returning to Lyotard’s distinction between the 
discursive and the figural, used to open this paper, this work arguably collapses that space in 
one gesture, or singular ‘event’. The work emerges from a project which required the 
exploration of a single colour, in this case, the choice was black. In her own words:   
“Chatterley’s Black is a documentation of my investigation into the colour 
black, tracing a journey from page to pigment.  
The novel Lady Chatterley’s Lover written by D.H. Lawrence in 
1928 was never ceremoniously burnt, but it was banned in Britain, on the 
grounds that it was sexually explicit. Penguin books was prosecuted under 
the Obscene Publications Act for publishing the book, which contained the 
use of the words ‘fuck’ and ‘cunt’ multiple times, along with sexual scenes. It 
was banned completely in England and Wales until the conclusion of the 
trial; by the mid-1980s, it was on the school syllabus as well as having been 
adapted for the screen numerous times. Penguin Books relied on Section 4's 
‘public good’ defense, with academics and literary critics such as E. M. 
Forster and Helen Gardner testifying at the trial that the book was one of 
literary merit. The trial at the Old Bailey eventually ended with a not guilty 
verdict, allowing the unexpurgated edition of the book to be openly published 
and sold in England for the first time since it was published in 1928. The trial 
is said to have change the face of literary censorship. 
As a comment on the continually shifting boundaries of censorship, I 
staged a book burning of the first unexpurgated edition of Lady Chatterley’s 
Lover. I then used the ashes of the novel to produce a traditional carbon 
pigment. I named the pigment Chatterley’s Black and used it to screen-print a 
film still captured from the first English language adaptation of the book.”—
Chloe True, 2012.  
 
 
It doesn’t seem too much of a stretch to suggest that by collapsing the space between the 
discursive and the figural, or between text and image (the image is literally comprised of the 
text), and by the ‘event’ of language as a base material (reduced to pigment through the act of 
burning) as it forms the image (a single image was printed, since this was the amount of 
pigment produced), the work opens up the space for a constellation of meanings to emerge; 
none privileged over the others. This work can be seen as both text and image, not either one 
or the other. It becomes a narrative of, not only the colour black, but of censorship, language, 
erasure, materiality, etc. The work amounts to a paradox, in the sense that the ‘difference’ 
which it embodies, in its ability to be this/not this, shows us the limits of representational 
thinking; since, as it strains against that limit, it simultaneously (and paradoxically), retrieves 
the intensity of thought, seen through the lens of ‘plasticity’ as an interruptive/transformative 
force in the transmission of meaning. The text of the book is literally the image, in such a way 
that the discursive and the figural are realigned and space between them collapsed. The not-
able-to-be-said is very much at play in Chloe True’s work, and through the singular event of 
printing the image from the burned text of the book (rendered as pigment). Benjamin’s notion 
	   25	  
of Darstellung8 acknowledges that truth cannot be the direct object of communication, but 
can only be glimpsed ‘para’ to its mode of expression, since it is not yet communicable in that 
form of presentation: in this case in the form of the photographic image. 
In contrast, in Anthony Burrill’s Oil Spill poster (2010), the text is constituted from 
the subject matter, by being printed in the same spilled BP oil fromrthe the Gulf of Mexico, 
which is inferred in the text, in such a way that medium and message are fully integrated.  
The difference between ‘Chatterly Black’ and Burrill’s work is that in the former, there is a 
hidden, or ‘para’ dimension to the work, since the text of the book forms the invisible base 
substance of the printed medium, while in Burrill, that relationship is more direct, and the 
message far less ambiguous. In Chloe True’s work, the process, or event of mobilizing the 
raw material of the original text is as important (if not more so) than the final outcome, while 
Burrill’s poster embraces process, but relies on the audiences’ recognition of the materiality 
of the outcome. Each engage materiality, and the event of language, but to different ends.  
In both examples, the meanings established by the image are rendered connotative, not 
denotative, which for Barthes are understood as: ‘irrecoverable instants’. In its singular 
printing, made from the burnt text of just one book, Chloe True’s work is particular, not 
universal. For Alexander Duttman, there’s a difference in what you can see ‘in’ the image (as 
in: there is a picture of petals on fire), and what you can see ‘to’ the image (as in: ‘There’s 
something ‘to’ it) (citation to be provided). The first is produced by representation, the second 
by ‘halting’ the process of knowing, in favour of something else, and that something else, is 
the fact of its making, out of the raw materials of the original text. In Burrill’s work, this 
halting is seen in the final object, where the viewer is asked to step back from language as 
denoting something outside itself, and return to the ‘noisy’ materiality of the text.   
In this kind of work, there is an indiscernibility between the ‘what should it be’, and 
everything ‘should be as it is’. All is as it should be, but not in the sense of a stable, fixed, 
form of representation.  
Work such as this offers the difference between language as representation 
(concept/object correspondence), and language as constellation/event. I would like to close by 
suggesting that, not only does the work shown in these examples, inhabit a different linguistic 
space, where the embodiment of ideas is fully bound to the materiality of 
writing/text/language, but that these works propose a new kind of material enactment of 
philosophical ideas such as Constellation and Event, which are all but impossible to invoke at 
the level of Warde’s ‘invisible’ typeset word. In such work, the stage of Materia Secunda, is 
enacted through the mobilization of the primary material of language, into new configurations, 
which realize the full potential of Materia Prima.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Benjamin offers fragmentary forms of representation: heterogeneous forms of ‘presentation’.  
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Example 2 (as a caption). Anthony Burrill’s limited-edition posters, printed in BP oil from the 
ecological disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. The oil was collected direct from the polluted 
beaches of Grand Isle, Louisiana. Here, text and image are literally ‘one’.  
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